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Abstract 
 
A new climate change treaty must address three current gaps: the absence of emissions 
targets extending far into the future, the absence of participation by the United States, 
China, and other developing countries, and the absence of reason to expect compliance.  
Moreover,  to  be  politically  acceptable,  a  post-Kyoto  treaty  must  recognize  certain 
constraints  regarding  country-by-country  economic  costs.    This  article  presents  a 
framework for assigning quantitative emissions allocations across countries, one budget 
period at a time, through a two-stage plan:  (i) China and other developing countries 
accept targets at business-as-usual (BAU) levels in the coming budget period, and, during 
the same period, the US agrees to cuts below BAU;   (ii) all countries are asked to make 
further cuts in the future in accordance with a formula which  includes a Progressive 
Reductions Factor, a Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a Gradual Equalization Factor.  An 
earlier proposal (Frankel 2009) for specific parameter values in the formulas achieved the 
environmental goal that CO2 concentrations plateau at 500 ppm by 2100.   It met our 
political constraints by keeping every country‘s economic cost below thresholds of Y=1% 
of income in Present Discounted Value, and X=5% of income in the worst period.   The 
framework proposed in this article attains a stricter concentration goal of 460 ppm CO2, 
but only by loosening the political constraints.   
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Introduction  
 
  Negotiators for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) have been hoping to achieve a successor to the Kyoto Protocol and to set 
emissions targets after 2012.   Although there was some progress at the meetings in 
Copenhagen  in  2010  and  Cancun  in  2011,  the  road  to  a  post-Kyoto  treaty  has  been 
blocked by a seemingly insurmountable obstacle: The United States, which until recently 
was the world‘s largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, is at loggerheads with China (the 
world‘s new largest emitter), India, and other developing countries.     
  On one side, the US Congress has made it clear that it will not impose quantitative 
limits on US GHG emissions if it appears that emissions from China, India, and other 
developing countries will continue to grow unabated.   Indeed,  this is the reason the 
Senate refused  to ratify the Kyoto  Protocol  in  the first  place. Why, the Senate  asks, 
should US firms bear the economic cost of cutting emissions if energy-intensive activities 
such as aluminum smelters and steel mills will just migrate to countries that have no caps 
and  therefore  have  cheaper  energy  –  the  problem  known  as  leakage  --  and  global 
emissions will continue their rapid rise?    
  On the other side, the leaders of India and China have made their position just as 
clear:   they are unalterably opposed to cutting emissions unless the United States and 
other rich countries cut theirs first.  They argue that poor countries should not be denied 
their turn at economic development.  After all, the industrialized countries created the 
problem of global climate change, while developing countries are responsible for only 
about 20 percent of the carbon dioxide (CO2) that has accumulated in the atmosphere   3 
from industrial activity over the past 150 years. India points out that Americans emit 
more than ten times as much CO2 per person as they do. 
  Fortunately,  there  might  be  a  politically  feasible  solution  to  the  apparently 
irreconcilable differences between the US and the developing countries regarding binding 
quantitative  targets.  What  is  needed  is  a  specific  framework  for  setting  the  actual 
numbers that future signers of a post-Kyoto treaty might realistically be expected to adopt 
as their emission targets.  Such an agreement would include a commitment by the United 
States to join Europe in adopting serious emission targets, while simultaneously, China, 
India, and other developing countries would agree to a path that immediately imposes on 
them binding emission targets—but in the first period these targets would simply follow 
the so-called business-as-usual (BAU) path.
1       
  Of course, an effective environmental solution also requires that  in future years 
China  and  the  other  developing  countries  make  cuts  below  their  BAU  path,  and 
eventually make cuts in absolute terms as well.  The negotiation process would become 
easier over time as participants gained confidence in the framework.    The point is that  
the developing countries can and should be asked to make cuts  in the future that do not 
differ in nature from those made by Europe, the United States, and others who have gone 
before them, taking due account of differences in income.   More specifically, emissions 
targets should be determined by formulas that: (i) give lower-income countries more time 
before they start to cut emissions, and (ii) lead to a gradual convergence across countries 
                                                 
1 BAU is generally defined as the path of increasing emissions that countries would follow in the absence 
of an international agreement. It is a counterfactual that can be generated through models on the basis of 
projections of such main drivers as population and GDP growth. One must recognize, however, substantial 
uncertainty over the BAU path of emissions..   4 
of emissions per capita over the course of the century, while (iii) not rewarding countries 
for joining the agreement late.    
There are currently many proposals on the table for a post-Kyoto climate change 
regime, even if one considers only those proposals that accept the basic Kyoto approach 
of quantitative, national-level limits on GHG emissions accompanied by international 
trade in emissions permits (i.e., cap and trade).   However, the Kyoto targets applied only 
to  the  budget  period  2008–2012,  and  only  to  a  minority  of  countries  (in  theory,  the 
industrialized countries).    The current  challenge is to extend quantitative emissions 
targets through the remainder of the century and to other countries—especially the United 
States, China, and other developing countries. 
Virtually all the existing proposals for a post-Kyoto agreement are based on scientific 
environmental objectives (e.g., stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 380 ppm in 
2100), ethical/philosophical considerations (e.g., the principle that every individual on 
earth  has  equal  emission  rights),  or  economic  benefit-cost  analyses  (weighing  the 
economic costs of abatement against the long-term environmental benefits). Important 
examples of the science-based approach, the benefit-cost-based approach, and the rights-
based approach are, respectively, Wigley, Richels and Edmonds (2007), Nordhaus (1994, 
2006), and Baer et al. (2008).   
Only credible announcements of future cuts will send firms the long-term price 
signals and incentives needed to guide investment decisions today. Announcements of 
future cuts are credible only if they are also politically viable.  In the real political world, 
no country – rich or poor – is likely to abide by targets in any given period that entail 
extremely  large  economic  sacrifice,  when  there  is  the  alternative  of  simply  not   5 
participating in the system.   Thus, rather than making sweeping proposals that assume 
otherwise, it is better to pursue the narrow thread of what is politically possible. This 
article, which is part of a symposium on Post-Kyoto International Policy Architecture,
2 
proposes a framework for allocating quantitative emissions targets for all countries for 
the remainder of the century. This framework is intended to be more practical than other 
proposals because it addresses political considerations, rather than being based solely on 
science or ethics or economics.
3   
 
The article is organized as follows.  In the next section we explain the motivation 
underlying our framework for setting emissions targets, beginning  with a discussion of 
the tremendous political obstacles and then an overview of our proposed approach.  The 
following section presents rules to guide the formulas for setting emissions targets.  We 
next  discuss  specific  post-Kyoto  quantitative  targets  announced  by  several  national 
leaders, which provide the basis for formulating reasonable targets for other countries in 
subsequent periods.  This  is  followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  factors  that  need  to  be 
included in the formulas to ensure that the emissions targets for developing countries are 
―fair.‖ Next we present the specific numerical emissions targets: that is, the paths that 
follow from the formulas for all countries and in all budget periods during this century.   
Finally,  we  estimate  the  economic  and  environmental  effects  of  the  proposed  targets 
using the WITCH model, an energy-economy-climate model developed by the climate 
                                                 
2 The other articles in this symposium are Cao (2012), Metcalf and Weisbach (2012), and Olmstead and 
Stavins (2012). 
3 Aldy, Barrett, and Stavins (2003) and Victor (2004) review a number of existing proposals.   Numerous 
others have offered their own thoughts on post-Kyoto plans, at varying levels of detail, including Aldy, 
Orszag, and Stiglitz (2001); Barrett (2006); Nordhaus (2006); and Olmstead and Stavins (2006).     6 
change modeling group at  Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
4  The conclusions 
section discusses why the proposed framework is politically credible and identifies some 
areas for future research. 
 
 
Constraints and a Proposed Solution for a Post-Kyoto Framework  
 
In 1997, the industrialized countries agreed to quantitative emissions targets for 
the Kyoto Protocol‘s first budget period.  So we know that in some sense it is possible to 
set quantitative emissions targets.     
At subsequent multilateral venues such as the UNFCCC meeting in Bali (2007) 
and the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in Hokkaido (July 2008), world leaders agreed on a 
broad long-term goal of cutting total global emissions in half by 2050.   At a meeting in 
L‘Aquila, Italy, in July 2009, the G8 leaders agreed to an environmental goal of limiting 
the  global  temperature  increase  to  2°C,  which  corresponds  roughly  to  a  GHG 
concentration level of 450 ppm (or approximately 380 ppm for CO2 alone).   However, 
these meetings did not come close to producing an agreement on who will cut how much. 
Nor did they result in an agreement on multilateral targets over a time horizon that is 
sufficiently short to ensure that the national leaders negotiating the agreements will likely 
still be alive when the abatement commitments come due.  To quote Al Gore (1993, 
p.353), ―politicians are often tempted to make a promise that is not binding and hope for 
                                                 
4 See  www.feem-web.it/witch.   7 
some unexpectedly easy way to keep the promise.‖  Thus, the aggregate targets endorsed 
so far cannot be viewed as being anything more than aspirational.  
Moreover, no enforcement mechanism has been developed that both has sufficient 
teeth and is acceptable to UNFCCC member countries.  Given the importance countries 
place on national sovereignty, it is unlikely that this situation will change any time soon.  
Hopes must rest instead on weak enforcement mechanisms such as the power of moral 
suasion, international opprobrium, and, possibly, trade measures.  We believe it is safe to 
say that in the event of a clash between such weak enforcement mechanisms and the 
prospect of a large economic loss to a particular country, aversion to the latter would 
overpower the former. 
 
A workable successor to Kyoto 
Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the framework proposed here seeks to bring all countries 
into a realistic international policy regime that looks far into the future.   We recognize, 
however,  that  it  is  not  possible  to  predict  a  century-long  horizon  with  as  much 
precision/certainty as a five- or ten-year horizon, and acknowledge that fixing precise 
numerical targets a century ahead is impractical.  Rather, what we need is a century-long 
sequence of negotiations, which fits within a common institutional framework that gains 
credibility as it goes along.   Such a framework must have enough continuity so that 
success in the early phases builds participants‘ confidence in each others‘ compliance 
commitments  and  in  the  fairness,  viability,  and  credibility  of  the  process.      Yet  the 
framework must also be flexible enough to accommodate the unpredictable fluctuations 
in economic growth, technology development, climate, and political sentiment that will   8 
inevitably occur.   Only by striking the right balance between continuity and flexibility 
can we hope that such a framework for addressing climate change will last a century or 
more.   
 
Recognizing political constraints 
Our proposed framework recognizes five political constraints: 
1.  The United States  will not  commit to  quantitative  targets  unless  China and other 
major developing countries commit to quantitative targets at the same time. (This 
proposition leaves open the initial level and future path of the targets.)  A plan will be 
considered unacceptable to the United States if it allows the less developed countries 
to exploit their lack of GHG regulation for ―competitive advantage‖ at the expense of 
the participating countries‘ economies and leads to emissions leakage at the expense 
of the environmental goal.  
2.  China, India, and other developing countries will not make sacrifices they view as 
a.  fully contemporaneous with rich countries, 
b.  different in character from those made in the past by richer countries, 
c.  preventing them from industrializing, 
d.  failing to recognize that richer countries should be prepared to make greater 
economic sacrifices to address the problem than developing countries, or 
e.  failing  to  recognize  that  the  rich  countries  have  benefited  from  an  unfair 
advantage in being allowed to achieve levels of per capita emissions that are 
far above those of the poor countries.   9 
3.  In the short run, emissions targets for developing countries must be calculated relative 
to current levels or BAU paths; otherwise the economic costs will be too great for 
developing countries to accept. However, in the longer run, no country should be 
rewarded for having "ramped up‖ emissions far above levels in an agreed-upon base 
year.    The  reference  year  agreed  upon  at  Rio  and  Kyoto  was  1990.    Fairness 
considerations aside, if post-1990 increases are permanently ―grandfathered,‖ then 
countries that have not yet agreed to emissions cuts will have an incentive to ramp up 
emissions prior to joining the agreement.  Of course, there was nothing ―magical‖ 
about  the  year  1990.  But,  for  better  or  worse,  it  is  the  year  on  which  Annex  I 
countries based their planning.
5   If the international consensus base year were to shift 
from 1990 to 2005, our proposal would follow suit. 
4.  No country will accept a path of targets that is expected to cost it more than Y percent 
of income throughout the 21
st century (in present discounted value).  We try to limit Y 
to 1 percent (as in Frankel, 2009). 
5.  No country will accept targets in any period that are expected to cost more than X 
percent of income to achieve during that period; alternatively, even if targets were 
already in place, no country would actually abide by them in the future if it were 
found that the cost of doing so would exceed X percent of income.  We define income 
losses relative to what would happen if the agreement were to unravel. We try to limit  
X to 5 percent as in Frankel (2009). 
 
 
                                                 
5 Annex I is the UNFCCC name for the list of industrialized countries, including the transition economies 
of the former Soviet bloc, that were called upon to cut emissions under the Kyoto Protocol.   10 
Addressing the constraints 
The  first  and  second  constraints  alone  would  seem  to  add  up  to  a  hopeless 
stalemate. Nothing much can happen without the United States, but the United States will 
not commit to emissions target cuts unless China and other developing countries agree to 
start cutting emissions at the same time, and China will not start to cut emission unless 
the rich countries have gone first.  However, there is a possible solution, an approach that 
satisfies all of the constraints: at the same time that the United States agrees to binding 
emissions cuts, China and other developing countries agree to a path that immediately 
imposes binding emissions targets on them—but in the early years these targets simply 
follow the BAU path.    
Our proposed formulas for setting emissions targets do ask substantially more of 
the developing countries in later decades.  But these formulas also follow basic notions of 
fairness  by  asking  only  for  cuts  that  are  analogous  in  magnitude  to  those  made  by 
countries which began abatement earlier and that make due allowance for developing 
countries‘ lower per capita income and emissions and their baseline of rapid growth.   
The outline for this approach was developed in earlier papers
 (Frankel, 1999, 2005, 2007; 
and  Aldy  and  Frankel,  2004),    which  suggested  that  the  formulas  used  to  develop 
emissions targets incorporate at least four variables (1990 emissions, emissions in the 
year of the negotiation, population, and income).  One might also include a few other, 
country-specific variables such as whether a country has coal or hydroelectric power -- 
though the 1990 level of emissions conditional on per capita income can largely capture 
such variables -- and perhaps a dummy variable for the transition economies.   11 
We  narrow  down  the  broad  family  of  emissions  target  formulas  to  a  more 
manageable set, by the development of the three factors that are designed to capture 
widely  held  notions  of  ―fairness‖  --  a  short-term  Progressive  Reductions  Factor,  a 
medium-term Latecomer Catch-up Factor, and a long-run Gradual Equalization Factor.  
They are defined below.  Next we put them into operation to produce specific numerical 
targets for all countries, for all remaining five-year budget periods of the 21
st century.   
These targets are then fed into the WITCH model in order to identify their economic and 
environmental  consequences.    The  framework  is  flexible  so  that  one  can  adjust  a 
parameter here or there—for example, if the economic cost borne by a particular country 
is deemed too high or the environmental progress deemed too low—without having to 
abandon the entire formulas framework. 
  Frankel (2009) showed that this approach could achieve an environmental goal of 
CO2 concentrations of 500 ppm while satisfying the political constraints.   However, far 
more aggressive cuts in emissions would be needed to attain the environmental goals of 
interest to policy makers.  The plan presented in this article achieves a more ambitious 
goal of 460 ppm.  What should be emphasized is that we take no position on the desirable 
stringency of the goal.  The proposed formulae could be tuned to be in line with different 
environmental targets. Obviously a more ambitious goal requires relaxing the constraints 
on the allowable losses that each country would agree to suffer. 
 
 Guidelines and Caveats for Setting Emissions Targets 
   12 
Under the proposed framework, all developing countries that have an ability to 
measure emissions would be asked to agree immediately to emissions targets that do not 
exceed  their  projected  BAU  baseline  trajectory.
6  The  idea  of   developing  countries 
committing  to  only  BAU  targets  in  the  early  decades  will  likely  provoke  strong 
objections from environmentalists and business interests in industrialized countries.  But 
this commitment is more important than it sounds because, by preventing the developing 
countries from exploiting the opportunity to go above their BAU paths, it both precludes 
the carbon leakage that, absent such an agreement, would undermine the environmental 
goal, and ameliorates the competitiveness concerns of carbon-intensive industries in the 
rich countries.      
This approach also recognizes that it would be unreasonable to ask China to agree 
to substantial absolute cuts in the short term.   Indeed, China might well object to being 
asked to take on any kind  of  binding targets  at the same time as the United States.   
However, it is important to emphasize that  China  would actually gain from such an 
commitment to BAU levels because it would be able to sell emission permits at the same 
world market price as  industrialized countries.   In contrast, at present,  China receives 
lower  prices  for  lower -quality  project  credits  under  the  Kyoto  Protocol‘s  Clean 
Development Mechanism.    
How  do  we  know  that  China  would  come  out  ahead  under  the  framework 
proposed  here?      To  accommodate  its  rapidly  growing  demand,  China  is  currently 
building roughly 100 power plants per year.     The cost of shutting down an already-
functioning coal-fired power plant in the United States is far higher than the cost of 
                                                 
6  Most countries in Africa would likely be exempted for several some years from any kind of commitment, 
even BAU targets, until they had better capacity to monitor emissions.   13 
building a new clean low-carbon plant in China to replace what might otherwise be a new 
dirty coal-fired plant.  For this reason, when an American firm pays China to cut its 
emissions voluntarily, thereby obtaining a permit that the American firm can use to meet 
its emission obligations, both parties benefit, even in strictly economic terms.    The 
environmental benefit is that China‘s emissions would (voluntarily) fall below its BAU 
commitment from the beginning.  From a dynamic perspective, and given the long-lived 
nature of these plants,  the incentive to shift towards a less carbon intensive capital stock 
will provide substantial additional benefits in ten or twenty years time, when China will 
also face a constraining target. 
One  must  acknowledge  that  BAU  paths  are  neither  easily  ascertained  nor 
immutable.    Countries  may  ―high-ball‖  their  BAU  estimates  in  order  to  get  more 
generous targets (though this may be difficult for those who have hitherto ―low-balled‖ 
their  claimed  emissions  path).  Even  assuming  that  estimates  are  unbiased,  important 
unforeseen  economic  and  technological  developments  could  occur  between  2010  and 
2020 that will shift the BAU trajectory for the 2020s, for example.  Any number of 
unpredictable events have already occurred in the years since 1990, including German 
reunification, the 1997–1998 East Asia crisis, the boom in the BRIC countries (Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China), the big rise in world oil prices, and the global financial crisis of 
2008–09.    
A first step toward addressing the practical difficulty of setting the BAU path 
would  be  to  specify  in  the  post-Kyoto  treaty  that  estimates  be  generated  by  an 
independent international expert body rather than by national authorities.  A second step 
would  be  to  update  the  BAU  paths  every  budget  period.    Allowing  for  periodic   14 
adjustments to the BAU baseline does risk undermining the incentive for carbon-saving 
investments, on the logic that such investments would reduce future BAU paths and thus 
reduce  future  target  allocations.
7  That  is  why  the formula proposed here includes  a 
Latecomer Catch-up Factor (see below), which rapidly diminishes the weight assigned to 
BAU after a few budget periods and instead  tethers countries to  their 1990 emissions 
levels in the medium run. 
Under the proposed framework, countries are expected to agree to the second step 
--  the setting of  quantitative targets that entail specific cuts below BAU ,  at a time 
determined by their circumstances.  In our initial simulations, the year chosen to require a 
commitment  to  cut emissions was generally  determined  by two thresholds: when  a 
country‘s average per capita income is projected to exceed $3000 per year and/or when 
its per capita annual emissions are projected to approach 1 ton or more.     We later 
found, however, that starting dates had to be further modified in order to satisfy our 
constraints regarding the distribution of economic losses. 
  The formulas approach proposed here assigns emissions targets in a way that is 
more sensitive to political realities than is typical of other proposed target paths, which 
are constructed either on the basis of a benefit-cost optimization or to deliver a particular 
environmental and/or ethical goal.   Specifically, our numerical targets are based on (a) 
commitments  that  political  leaders  in  various  key  countries  had  already  proposed  or 
adopted, as of 2009, and (b) formulas designed to assure latecomer countries that the 
emission cuts they are asked to make represent no more than their fair share, in that they 
correspond to the sacrifices that other countries have already made.    
                                                 
7 This risk is the same as the risk of encouraging countries to ramp up their emissions, which we specified 
above would be axiomatically ruled out under any viable proposal.   15 
Our approach seeks to incorporate a further constraint arising in practical political 
realities.  The constraint is that the emissions targets must not impose on any country an 
economic cost of more than X% of income, or else the country drops out.  Dropping out 
could involve either explicit renunciation of the treaty or failure to meet the quantitative 
targets.  Our assumption here is that under any such scenario, the whole scheme would 
eventually unravel.   This unraveling would occur much earlier if private actors rationally 
perceived that at some point in the future major players would face such high economic 
costs that compliance would break down.  In this case, the future carbon prices that are 
built  into  most  models‘  compliance  trajectories  would  lack  credibility,  private  actors 
today would not make investment decisions that reflect those projected future prices, and 
the effort would fail in the first period.  Therefore, our approach to any scenario in which 
any major player is estimated to suffer economic losses greater than X% has been to go 
back and try to adjust some of the starting dates or other parameters of the emissions 
target formulas, so that economic losses are less than X%. 
  We  believe  that  these  measures  and  mechanisms  offer  the  greatest  hope  for 
achieving  political  viability:  non-negative  economic  gains  in  the  early  years  for 
developing  countries,  average  costs  below  Y  percent  of  income  per  annum  over  the 
course of the century, and protection for every country against losses as large, or larger 
than, X percent of income in any period.   
 
Starting  point  for  emissions  target  parameters:  Near-term  goals 
announced by national leaders 
   16 
  The starting point for calculating the emissions targets proposed in our framework 
are the near-term goals that were announced by several national leaders in anticipation of 
the Copenhagen meeting. We are guided by these near-term commitments when choosing 
the parameters in our formulas in the next part of the paper.  We work in terms of the 12 
geographic units – countries and groupings of countries -- of the WITCH model. We 
work in  terms  of five-year budget  periods. We calculated  country-specific or region-
specific numeric emission targets for every fifth year (e.g., 2015, 2020).  For each five-
year budget period, computations are based on the midpoint.   For example the Kyoto 
period (2008–2012) is indicated by 2010. 
 
The European Union 
The European Union (EU) emissions target for 2008-2012 -- 8 percent  below 
1990 levels – was agreed upon at Kyoto.
8  In 2008, the EU committed to a target for the 
2015–2020  budget  period  of  20  percent  below  1990  levels,  but
9  said  that  if other 
countries joined in, it would cut emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels.  Frankel (2009) 
used a target of 20% below 1990 levels for the EU.  Here we are more ambitious all 
around.  Thus we set an EU target for the year 2020 of 30% below 1990 levels.  For the 
2020–2025 period, and thereafter up to the eighth period (2045–2050), we have the EU 
targets progress in equal increments up to a 50 percent cut below 1990 levels. That is, 
emissions targets start at 35 percent below 1990 emissions and progress to 50 percent 
below 1990 emissions in the 2045-2050 period. 
                                                 
8 Ellerman and Buchner (2008) show that the difference between allocations and emissions in 2005 and 
2006 was probably in part attributable to abatement measures implemented in response to the positive price 
of carbon.   
9 Financial Times, Jan. 2, 2009, p.5.   17 
 
Japan, Canada, and New Zealand 
For the Kyoto budget period, these three Pacific countries are assigned the goal of 
a 6 percent reduction below 1990 levels.  Of all the Kyoto Protocol ratifiers, Canada is 
probably the farthest from achieving its Kyoto goal by 2012.  In a concession to realism, 
we assume that these three countries do not reach the Kyoto target until 2012 (versus 
reaching it on average over the 2008–2012 budget period). 
  What about future budget periods?  We focus here on Japan since it dominates 
this  country  grouping  in  terms  of  its  economic  size.    In  2008,  Japan‘s  then-Prime 
Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, announced a decision to cut Japan‘s emissions 60–80 percent by 
mid-century, and, in 2009, his successor, Taro Aso, announced a plan to cut emissions 15 
percent by 2020.
10  In September 2010, the incoming Prime Minister, Yukio Hatoyama, 
declared a goal of cutting emissions to 25 percent below 1990 levels over the next 10 
years, provided that other countries set similarly ambitious targets.
11  Reflecting Japan‘s 
announcements, our framework assumes that these three countries in aggregate cut their 
emissions 10 percent every five years between 2010 and 2050, computed logarithmically.  
The cumulative cuts are 80 percent in logarithmic terms (=8x10 percent), or 51 percent in 
absolute terms.  In other words, by 2050, emissions fall to 49 percent of the year–2010 
emissions level. 
 
The United States  
                                                 
10 ―Japan Pledges Big Cut in Emissions,‖ FT, June 10, 2008 p.6; and Associated Press, June 10, 2009, 
respectively. 
11 The Japan Times, September 8, 2009.   18 
In the United States, the Lieberman–Warner legislation,
12 introduced in the Senate in 
2007, would have begun by reducing emissions in 2012 to below 2005 levels and would 
have tightened the emissions cap gradually each year thereafter, so that by the year 2050 
total emissions would be held to  30 percent of 2012 levels.
13 Frankel (2009) assumed 
U.S. targets that cut the average annual emissions growth rate in half during  the period 
2008–2012 period, to 0.7 percent per year.
14 At that point, emissions  were assumed to 
plateau (growth  was  held to zero) for the period  2012–2017.  Then  the  rest  of  the 
Lieberman–Warner formula was implemented, such that emissions in 2050 reach a level 
67 percent below 1990 levels.
15  Spread over 38 years, this  approach implied sustained 
reductions of 2.6 percent per year on average, or 13 percent every five years.  During the 
2008  US  presidential  election  campaign,  the  Republican  candidate,  John  McCain 
advocated a 2050 emissions target of 60 percent below 1990 levels
16  while Barack 
Obama endorsed a more aggressive target of reducing 2050 emissions 80 percent below 
1990 levels.
17 
The  Waxman-Markey bill  (the American Clean-Energy and Security Act, or 
ACES Act), which was passed by the House of Representatives in June 2009 (but not the 
Senate) was less aggressive with respect to the near -term targets.   It specified that US 
emission allowances, or permits, would continue to grow at 3 percent per year from 2012 
to 2017.  On the other hand, the Waxman-Markey bill was aggressive with respect to the 
                                                 
12 S. 2191: America's Climate Security Act of 2007. 
13 In other words, a 70 percent reduction from emissions levels at the start date of the policy.  Section 1201, 
pages 30-32.  (The percentage is measured non-logarithmically.) 
14  This is equivalent to 3.5 percent cumulatively, so that emissions in 2012 are 31.5 percent above 1990 
levels, or 27 percent above 1990 levels logarithmically. 
15 Using the postponed base of the  emissions plateau described above this is 98.5 percent below 2012 
levels, logarithmically.   
16 Or 66 percent below 2005 levels.  Washington Post, May 13, 2008, p. A14; and FT, May 13, 2008, p.4.   
17 FT, Oct. 17, 2008.   19 
subsequent 33 years, assuming emissions reductions of about 5 percent per year from 
2017 to 2050 (unless the price ceiling on allowances specified by an escape clause were 
to kick in).    In  this paper we use the numbers in the Waxman-Markey bill to represent 
the US position and to help determine the parameters for others who come to the table 
subsequently. 
 
Australia, South Korea and South Africa  
Until  relatively  recently, it seemed  unlikely  that any  ―non-Annex  I‖ countries 
would commit to cuts below a BAU growth path within the next decade.   But in 2008, 
the new president of South Korea, Myung-bak Lee, offered ―a plan to cap emissions at 
current levels over the first Kyoto period.‖
18  This was an ambitious target in light of 
Korea‘s  high  economic  growth  rate.  He  also  announced  that,  like  the  industrialized 
countries (a group to which Korea now belongs), ―his country would slash emissions in 
half by 2050.‖
19   Korea‘s emissions had risen 90 percent since 1990, and it is hard to 
imagine any country applying the brakes so sharply as to switch instantly from 5 percent 
annual growth to zero growth in emissions.    
In the regional groupings of our model, South Korea is grouped with South Africa 
and Australia:   all three are coal-dependent.    South  Africa proposed  in 2008  that its 
emissions  would peak by  2025 and begin  declining by  2030.
20  But South  Africa is 
considerably smaller than the other two members of this grouping.   
                                                 
18 ―South Korea Plans to Cap Emissions,‖ International Herald Tribune, March 21, 2008.   
19  ―South Korea: Developing Countries Move Toward Targets,‖ Lisa Friedman, ClimateWire, Oct. 3, 2008. 
20 ClimateWire, Oct.3, 2008, op cit.   Statements from environmental or foreign ministries do not 
necessarily carry a lot of weight, if they have not been vetted by finance or economics ministries let alone 
issued by heads of government or approved by parliaments,.   An example would be Argentina‘s 
announcement of a target in 1998.   20 
The Australian government has been reluctant to take strong actions on emissions 
reductions because the country is so dependent on coal.   In 2008, however, then-Prime-
Minister Kevin Rudd announced plans to cut Australia‘s emissions to 60 percent below 
2000 levels by 2050.
21 In 2009, the government set a target to cut emissions to 5 percent 
below 2000 levels by 2020.   
We have interpreted the Korean plan to flatten emissions as covering a period that 
extends over the next  decade, so that in 2020 the level of emissions is the same as in 
2005.  We have further chosen to represent by this formulation the entire three -country 
grouping.  (Korea is bracketed above by Australia and below by South Africa, in terms of 
per capita income and presumed obligation for early action.)  We also use the Korean 
plan to help parameterize the formulas that are reasonable to ask of others who come 
later. 
 
China 
Getting  China  to  agree  to  binding  commitments  is  the  sine  qua  non  of  any 
successful post-Kyoto plan.  In August 2009, a top Chinese climate change policy-maker 
set a target for emissions to peak by 2050.  Frankel (2009) assumed that China would 
start cutting emissions relative to BAU in 2030.  But since the current proposal assumes 
more aggressive cuts by the industrialized countries during this period, and the year-2100 
goal  of  CO2  concentrations  at  460  ppm  cannot  be  met  without  substantial  effort  by 
China, we now move up the date at which China begins to cut to 2025.    
 
Other developing countries 
                                                 
21  ―FACTBOX – Greenhouse gas curbs from Australia to India,‖ Sept.5, 2008, Reuters.  .   21 
In  mid-2009,  Mexican  President  Felipe  Calderon's  environment  minister,  Juan 
Rafael  Elvira,  announced  that  the  country  was  committing  to  reduce  the  country‘s 
greenhouse gas emissions by 50 million metric tons a year between 2009 and 2012, and 
by 50 percent below 2002 levels by 2050.
22   But there was no indication that the rest of 
Latin America was ready to follow suit. 
For Latin America and all other developing countries, we assign emission targets 
according to the formulas that have been parameterized so as to fit the countries that have 
gone before them. 
 
Factors for ensuring “fair” emissions target formulas 
There are four issues that must still be resolved before we can calculate emissions 
target formulas across all countries: (1) how to determine the magnitude of China‘s cuts 
in the first budget period in which it is asked to make cuts below BAU; (2) how to 
determine  cuts in its second budget period for those developed countries which haven‘t 
committed to pledges; (3) how to set targets for everyone else, including Latin America 
(which, in light of its stage of development, should, like Korea, act before China and 
India), the Middle East/North Africa, Southeast Asia, India/South Asia, and Africa; and 
(4) how to set targets for everyone, including developed countries, after 2050.    
  
Our  general  guiding  principle  for  determining  the  emissions  targets  once 
developing countries start cutting below BAU is to ask countries to set targets and make 
cuts that are analogous to those made by others that have gone before them. We put this 
                                                 
22  ―Mexico: A Model for Developing Countries,‖ Council on Hemispheric Affairs, August 12, 2009. 
http://www.coha.org/2009/08/mexico-a-model-for-developing-countries/.   22 
general ―fairness‖ principle into practice by including three factors in the emissions target 
formulas.    These  three  factors,  which  are  additive  (logarithmically),  are  discussed  in 
detail below. 
 
Progressive Reductions Factor 
The first component is  called the Progressive Reductions Factor (PRF) and is 
based on the progressive pattern of emissions reductions (relative to BAU) that other  
countries have already committed to, expressed as a function of income per capita. This 
pattern is illustrated in Figure 1, which comes from the data as they were reported at thae 
time of the Kyoto Conference of Parties.  The graph confirms that the emissions cuts 
agreed to at Kyoto were progressive with respect to income. That is, other things equal, 
richer countries were asked to make more severe cuts relative to BAU (i.e., the status quo 
or baseline) in the first period.   Specifically, each 1 percent difference in income per 
capita  (measured  relative  to  EU  income  in  1997),  increases  a  country‘s  abatement 
obligation  by  γ  percent,  where  the  abatement  obligation  is  measured  in  terms  of 
reductions from BAU (relative to the EU cuts agreed to at Kyoto).   
The PRF formula is:  
PRF  (expressed as country‘s emissions cuts relative to BAU) 
 =        EU's Kyoto commitment for 2008 relative to its BAU                                                       
+  .14 * (gap between the country’s  current income per capita and the EU’s income per 
capita in 2007).  
The parameter (γ = 0.14) comes from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates 
using the data shown in Figure 1.    Different values for the parameter could be chosen if   23 
the parties to a new agreement wanted to increase or decrease the degree of progressivity 
of the emissions targets. 
 
Figure 1:  Emissions Cuts from BAU Under the Kyoto Protocol Relative to Income 
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Data Sources: The World Bank, the U.S. Energy Information Administration and country communications with the 
UNFCCC 
 
We apply this formula to developing countries that agree to accept cuts in the 
future. Normally, at least in the early budget periods, most developing countries‘ incomes 
will be below the European countries‘ incomes in 1997, so the PRF dictates milder cuts 
relative to BAU for developing countries than those made by European countries under 
Kyoto.  In fact, the resulting targets are likely to reflect a ―growth path‖ for developing 
countries—that is, they will allow for actual emission increases relative to the preceding 
periods.     24 
 
Latecomer Catch-up Factor 
The second ―fairness‖ factor in the formula is the Latecomer Catch-up Factor 
(LCF).  Latecomers are defined as those countries that either have not ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol or for which Kyoto did not set quantitative targets. These countries should not 
be rewarded by permanently readjusting their targets to a higher baseline.  Aside from 
notions of fairness, such re-setting of the baseline would give all latecomers an incentive 
to ramp up their emissions before signing on to binding targets, or, at a minimum, would 
undercut  any  socially-conscious  incentives  they  might  otherwise  introduce  to  reduce 
emissions unilaterally in the time period before they join the system.   Thus, the LCF is 
designed to gradually close the gap between the starting point for latecomers and their 
1990  emission  levels.    The  LCF  requires  further  percentage  cuts  in  emissions  by  a 
country (relative to BAU plus PRF) the more emissions have been allowed to rise above 
1990  levels  by  the  time  the  country  joins  the  agreement.  Hence,  the  LCF  parameter 
indicates the force with which latecomers are pulled back toward their 1990 emissions 
levels.    The factor is given by:   
LCF  =  α  -  λ  log(country’s current emissions / country’s 1990 emissions),  
  At  the time the Kyoto Protocol  was  negotiated, the  analogous parameter for 
Europe was sufficient to pull the EU average below its 1990 level by 2012.   However, 
the countries for which calibrating this formula is most relevant are not European, since 
the Europeans are not latecomers. Rather, the relevant countries are the United States and 
Korea, since these are the only countries among those that did not commit to Kyoto 
targets whose political leaders had by 2009 indicated explicit targets that were acceptable   25 
in  the  second  budget  period.    Therefore,  in  our  analysis,  the  LCF  is  parameterized 
according  to  the  numbers  implicit  in  the  proposals  made  by  leaders  in  these  two 
countries.   The United States and Korea are used as trend setters; other countries are 
asked to move gradually in the direction of 1990 emissions at the same speed that these 
two have before them. 
The LCF parameters, which are applied to all latecomers, are chosen so as to 
match  the  numbers  implicit  in  the  Waxman  Markey  bill,  which  would  bring  US 
emissions to 70 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, and the numbers implicit in the Lee 
proposal to flatten South Korea‘s emissions over a period beginning in 2008.     In other 
words, countries are asked to move gradually in the direction of 1990 emissions in the 
same way as the United States and Korea would have done before them. 
Given these two benchmarks, the numerical estimates for the LFC parameters are  
α=0.54   and λ=0.773.   The Latecomer Catch-up Factor thus works out to:                 
LCF  = 0.54  - 0.773  log(country’s current emissions / country’s 1990 emissions).
23  
 
     In order to come close to achieving our environmental target (460 ppm of CO2 is 
as close as we can get) without unacceptable economic costs in some countries, we had to 
sacrifice a little of the simplicity of the LCF equation by adding dummy variables for 
both the transition economies (TE) and China.  Specifically, because the TE experienced 
emissions  in  1990  that  were  higher  than  the  subsequent  trend,  whereas  China  will 
                                                 
23 This catch-up parameter is much stronger than the one used in Frankel (2009).  If Korea were to back 
away from its president‘s commitment, but some other important middle-income country were to come 
forward with explicit and specific numerical targets, then the calculation could be redone.         26 
experience  extremely  high  costs  due  to  the  projected  baseline,  we  insert  special 
adjustment terms:  0.38 for the TE and -0.13 for China.
24 
 
Gradual Equalization Factor 
The third ―fairness‖ factor is the Gradual Equalization Factor (GEF).  Under our 
proposal, even though developing countries are not asked to undertake abatement efforts 
until  after  the  rich  countries  have  begun  to  act,  and  they  face  milder  reduction 
requirements, they are still likely to claim that it is unfair that although the rich countries 
created the environmental problem,  the poor countries will bear a disproportionate share 
of the costs.   
On the one hand, such complaints are not unreasonable.  If we were to include 
only the first two factors in our formula, the richer countries would in effect be granted 
the permanent right to emit more GHGs than the developing countries, every year in 
perpetuity.  This would be unfair.    
On the other hand, calls for rich countries to cut their per capita emissions rapidly 
in the short run, toward the levels of developing countries, ignore the reality that the 
economic costs of such a requirement would be so high that no rich country would ever 
agree to it.  However, the situation changes when we look at the longer run (i.e., 50 to 
100  years).  When  countries  are  given  time  to  adjust,  the  economic  costs  are  not 
impossibly high, and it is reasonable to ask rich countries to bear their full share of the 
burden of emissions reductions.  Furthermore, over a time horizon this long, some of the 
developing countries will likely become high-income countries (and possibly vice versa). 
                                                 
24 This is a departure from our preferred principle of applying the same formula for all countries (as done in 
Frankel, 2009), a simplification that is appealing both aesthetically and politically.  But, as noted above, it 
is one of the concessions we have to make to attain the more aggressive environmental goal.      27 
Thus, during each decade of the second half of the century, we include an equity 
factor in the formula, the GEF, that moves per capita emissions in each country a small 
step toward the global average -- downward in the case of the rich countries and upward 
in the case of the poor countries.  Asymptotically, the repeated application of this factor 
would  eventually  leave  all  countries  with  equal  emissions  per  capita,  although 
corresponding national targets need not necessarily converge fully by 2100.
25   
  The parameter for the speed of adjustment toward the world average was initially 
chosen to match the rate at  which the EU‘s already-announced  goals  for 2045–2050 
converge to the world average.   This number is 0.1 per five-year budget period, which is 
also very similar to the rate of convergence implicit in the U.S. goals set for the 2045–
2050 period in the Lieberman-Warner legislation.  Thus the GEF formula is: 
 
GEF = -0.1 (percentage gap between country’s lagged emissions per capita and world 
average emissions per capita).             
 
The global equalization parameter is not set in stone and one could increase the speed 
towards equal  per capita emissions  as  a way to reach more ambitious  environmental 
targets.  This  obviously  would  result  in  higher  costs,  especially  for  countries  such  as 
China and the TE.   
 
 
                                                 
25 Motivated by a rights-based approach, Zhang (2008) and others propose that countries ―contract and 
converge‖ to targets that reflect equal emissions per capita.  The Greenhouse Development Rights approach 
of Baer et al. (2008), as extended by Cao (2009), emphasizes, from a philosophical standpoint, the 
allocation of equal emission rights at the individual level, though these authors appear to recognize that, in 
practice, individual targets would have to be aggregated and implemented at the national level.      28 
Numerical emissions targets for all countries in all decades 
This section describes the specific numerical emissions targets that were produced by 
applying the proposed formulas to all countries in all budget periods during this century.  
Table 1 indicates the years that each of the eleven countries or regional groupings is 
asked to commit to BAU targets (column 1) and then reductions below BAU (column 2, 
which shows the year that the PRF and LCF are included in the formulas, and column 3, 
which shows the year that GEF is added to the formulas).   The dates in Table 1 are 
earlier  than  those  in  Frankel  (2009)  because  of  this  paper‘s  more  aggressive 
environmental goal of 460 ppm.   
 
Table 1: Years when participants commit to targets at and below BAU  
 
First year of commitment 
(TARGET or BAU) 
First year of commitment to TARGET 
(which includes PCF & LCF) below  
BAU 
year when GEF  is included 
in formula 
USA  2010  2010  2050 
EU  2010  2010  2050 
KOSAU  2010  2020  2050 
CAJAZ  2010  2015  2050 
TE  2010  2025  2055 
MENA  2010  2025  2055 
SSA  2025  2050  2080 
SASIA  2010  2025  2055 
CHINA  2010  2025  2055 
EASIA  2010  2025  2055 
LAM  2010  2020  2050 
 
NOTE: 
USA=UnitedStates 
EU = Western and Eastern Europe    KOSAU = Korea, South Africa + Australia (all coal-users) 
CAJAZ = Canada, Japan + New Zealand  TE = Russia and other Transition Economies 
MENA = Middle East + North Africa    SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa 
SASIA= India and the rest of South Asia  CHINA = PRC 
EASIA = Smaller countries of East Asia  LAM = Latin America + the Caribbean   29 
Table 2: Actual emissions per capita for 11 regions, throughout the century (ton 
CO2 per capita)  
  USA  EURO  KOSAU  CAJAZ  TE  MENA  SSA  SASIA  CHINA  EASIA  LAM 
2005  20.42  8.65  11.97  11.96  7.92  4.83  0.23  0.87  4.79  1.73  3.00 
2010  20.76  9.10  10.96  12.39  8.54  5.26  0.27  0.91  4.89  2.08  3.24 
2015  19.65  9.14  10.23  12.50  8.82  5.52  0.29  1.03  5.39  2.37  3.53 
2020  18.16  8.80  9.41  12.08  8.96  5.66  0.31  1.02  5.78  2.60  3.83 
2025  16.52  8.25  8.60  11.39  8.71  5.35  0.32  1.01  5.33  2.65  3.89 
2030  12.65  6.61  6.98  9.17  6.60  4.01  0.27  0.86  4.69  2.25  3.27 
2035  10.17  5.50  5.87  7.62  5.46  3.29  0.24  0.78  4.25  1.98  2.76 
2040  8.62  4.80  5.14  6.60  4.84  2.92  0.23  0.74  3.99  1.84  2.58 
2045  7.47  4.27  4.60  5.80  4.42  2.70  0.23  0.72  3.81  1.73  2.47 
2050  6.49  3.78  4.13  5.08  4.05  2.50  0.23  0.71  3.66  1.62  2.37 
2055  5.67  3.36  3.74  4.45  3.92  2.35  0.22  0.70  3.52  1.52  2.28 
2060  5.01  3.00  3.41  3.90  3.91  2.24  0.22  0.69  3.41  1.43  2.21 
2065  4.40  2.68  3.10  3.40  3.89  2.14  0.23  0.68  3.29  1.33  2.13 
2070  3.82  2.40  2.82  3.08  3.88  2.04  0.23  0.66  3.16  1.22  2.04 
2075  3.29  2.13  2.56  3.05  3.86  1.94  0.23  0.64  3.03  1.12  1.95 
2080  2.80  1.92  2.46  3.02  3.84  1.84  0.22  0.62  2.90  1.01  1.86 
2085  2.33  1.89  2.45  2.99  3.82  1.74  0.22  0.60  2.76  0.90  1.75 
2090  1.96  1.87  2.44  2.97  3.79  1.62  0.22  0.57  2.67  0.79  1.63 
2095  1.83  1.83  2.42  2.93  3.73  1.44  0.21  0.51  2.67  0.64  1.44 
2100  1.68  1.78  2.41  2.88  3.65  1.29  0.20  0.45  2.70  0.57  1.22 
 
Table  2  reports  projected  emissions,  expressed  in  per  capita  terms,  for  each 
country or region in every budget period.   The United States is particularly conspicuous 
in terms of its current high per capita emissions, but its target path begins to decline after 
2010.    Emissions  in  all  the  rich  regions  decline  rapidly  between  2020  and  2050.   
Emissions in developing countries continue to rise for a bit longer, and then come down 
more gradually, but of course their per capita emissions start from a much lower base.   
China peaks in 2020, at 5.8 tons of CO2, or about 1½ tons of carbon (C), per capita.  
However, none of the other developing countries ever gets above 1 ton C per capita.  In 
contrast, the industrialized countries emit between 2 and 5½ tons C per capita before they   30 
start to cut emissions.   In the second half of the century, all of the countries/regions 
converge to levels below one ton C per capita.     
 
 
Figure 2: 
Assigned targets and actual emissions for industrialized countries in the aggregate  
(Note: Predicted actual emissions exceed targets by amount of allowance – or permit -- 
purchases.) 
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Figure 2 presents the assigned aggregate targets (caps) for member countries of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).  These targets 
decline from about 4 gigatons (Gt) C in 2020 to 1 Gt C in 2060.  The figure also shows 
the  simulated  value  for  actual  emissions  from  OECD  countries,  which  decline  more 
gradually  than  the  targets  through  2070  because  carbon  allowances  (permits)  are 
purchased on the world market, as is economically efficient.   The total value of the 
permit purchases is about ½ Gt C in the middle decades of the century.   The quantity of 
permits purchased by the OECD countries is generally less than one fifth of their total   31 
reductions, with the US being the largest buyer.   This is a far smaller trading share than 
Frankel (2009) entailed, due to the tougher targets assigned to the developing countries 
under the current plan.   In addition, legislation in both Brussels and Washington places 
limits  on  the  amount  of  emissions  reductions  that  can  be  achieved  through  permit 
purchases.  The trading share falls off sharply in the second half of the century.    
 
Figure  3:  Assigned  targets  and  actual  emissions  for  non-OECD  countries  in  the 
aggregate 
 (Note: Predicted actual emissions fall below caps by amount of permit sales) 
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Concerning the non-OECD countries, emissions peak in 2020 in the TE group, 
MENA, China, and Latin America, but in sub-Saharan Africa, emissions remain at very 
low levels throughout the century.  Figure  3 shows that among non-OECD countries 
overall, both emissions targets and actual emissions peak in 2020.   The simulated path of 
actual emissions lies a little above the target caps, again due to the value of permits sold   32 
by the developing countries to the industrialized countries.   Total emissions for non-
OECD countries fall to 2 Gt C at the beginning of the 22
nd century.   
Total world emissions peak in 2020 below 10 Gt C, as shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4:   Global emissions in the BaU and under the Assigned Targets 
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Economic and environmental consequences of the proposed targets 
 
Estimating the economic and environmental implications of any set of targets is a 
complex task.
26   This section discusses the economic and environmental consequences of 
                                                 
26 Researchers have applied a number of different models to estimate the economic and environmental 
effects of various specific proposed emission paths; see, for example, Edmonds, Pitcher, Barns, Baron, and 
Wise (1992); Edmonds, Kim, McCracken, Sands, and Wise (1997);  Hammett (1999);  Manne, 
Mendelsohn, and Richels (1995); Manne and Richels (1997);  McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2007); and 
Nordhaus (1994, 2008).  Weyant (2001) provides an explanation and comparison of different models.   33 
the numerical emissions targets proposed here, as estimated by the WITCH model, which 
has  been used extensively in  the past  five  years  to  analyze  the economic impacts  of 
climate  change  policies.  WITCH  is  a  hybrid  top-down  economic  model  with  energy 
sector disaggregation.
27  Those who might be skeptical of economists‘ models on the 
grounds that ―technology is the answer‖ should rest assured that technology is central to 
this model,     as it features endogenous technological change via both experience and 
innovation processes. Countries are grouped into twelve regions (with Western Europe 
and  Eastern  Europe  grouped  separately)  that  cover  the  world  and  that  interact 
strategically following a game theoretic set-up.  
The original baselines in many models have been deflected in recent years by 
such developments as stronger-than-expected growth in Chinese energy demand and the 
2008 spike in world oil prices.   Accordingly, the WITCH model has been updated with 
more recent data, and projections have been revised for key drivers such as population, 
GDP, fuel prices, and energy technology characteristics. The base calibration year has 
been set at 2005, for which data on socio-economic, energy, and environmental variables 
are available (Bosetti, De Cian, Sgobbi, and Tavoni, 2009b). 
 
Economic effects 
Although economists trained in benefit-cost analysis tend to focus on economic 
costs expressed in terms of income, those who are politically attuned tend to focus also 
on the predicted carbon price, which in turn has a direct impact on the prices of gasoline, 
home heating oil, and electric power.    The WITCH model estimates that the price of  
                                                 
27 The model and its detailed structure are described in Bosetti et al. (2006) and Bosetti, Massetti, and 
Tavoni (2007). 
   34 
CO2 that would result under the proposed targets rises very substantially, reaching $1800 
per ton in 2100, see Figure 5.  This is a high number, approximately twice the CO2 price 
with an environmental goal of 500 ppm.   At least the called for rise is monotonic during 
the course of the century, however, which is a desirable property.     
 
Figure 5:  Price of Carbon Dioxide Rises Steadily Over the Century  
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The right margin of the graph translates the cost from dollars per ton of carbon to 
terms that the American consumer can relate to:    the increment to the cost of gasoline.   
It rises to European levels by 2040, and to $16 per gallon in 2100.   35 
Economic losses by region, measured in terms of national income, are illustrated 
for the first and second halves of the century in Figure 6a and 6b, respectively.
28   These 
losses also rise gradually.  This is a good outcome, because a positive rate of time 
discount means that losses come later count less than losses that come earlier.  As late as 
2055, all regions sustain economic losses that are no greater than 3.5 per cent of 
income.
29    However, later in the century, the costs go much higher, above 11 percent of 
income in the case of TE and China.   The costs estimated here, using the WITCH model, 
are broadly in line with those estimated by a range of other leading models, as 
summarized in Clarke, et al (2009). 
 
In one sense, the costs of participation in the proposed framework are 
overestimated, increasingly so in the later decades, if the alternative to participating in the 
treaty for one more decade is dropping out after seven or eight decades of participation.  
The reason is that countries will have already substantially altered their capital stocks and 
economic structures in a carbon-friendly direction.  The economic costs reported in the 
simulations and graphs treat the alternative to participation as having never joined the 
treaty in the first place.   In another sense, however, the costs are underestimated, because  
any country that drops out can exploit leakage opportunities, as its firms are able to buy 
fossil fuels at far lower prices than their competitors in countries that continue to 
participate.   
 
                                                 
28 The graphs in the working paper show emissions targets in 5-year intervals.  Here they have been 
aggregated into 10-year intervals for easier visibility. 
29As of mid-century, the US is running the largest cost among OECD countries, relative to BAU, and 
MENA and China are running the largest costs among non-OECD countries.    36 
 
Figure 6:  Income Losses by Region and Period  
a)  2010-2045 
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b) 2050- 2100 
 
-15.0%
-10.0%
-5.0%
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
2060 2070 2080 2090
USA EU KOSAU CAJAZ TE MENA SSA SASIA CHINA EASIA LAM
 
   37 
After 2065, the combination of parameters yields costs that rise above our self-
imposed threshold of 5 percent of national income, a consequence of the more aggressive 
environmental goal.  All economic effects are deliberately gross of environmental 
benefits—that is, no attempt is made to estimate environmental benefits or net them out.   
 
We measure the present discounted value (PDV) of costs using a discount rate of 
5 percent.  Total economic costs are estimated to be 1.39 percent of annual gross world 
product. The discounted economic costs by region are presented in Figure 7, and range 
from over 3% benefit accruing to Sun Saharan Africa, gaining from selling emission 
allowances to the rest of the world,  to  the losses larger than 2%  accruing to TE and 
China.   
The  more  conventional  approach  would  be  to  choose  country  targets  with  no 
constraint  beyond  minimizing  the  PDV  of  country  costs.    We  believe  that  our 
contribution is the simplicity of a common formula across countries and across time, the 
constraint that no country endures an unusually high cost in any single period, and the 
correspondingly enhanced credibility.  Nevertheless, we have explored what happens if 
we  jettison  the  formulas  and  simply  choose  country  targets  so  as  to  minimize  the 
threshold for PDV of country costs   The outcome: the gain from the reduced PDV of 
losses is small, on the order of 1/10 of one percent of GDP, relative to the results of our 
formulas approach.   
 
 
Figure 7: Economic Costs of Emissions Targets by Region, 2010-2100, as a 
percentage of GDP   38 
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Note: Costs are discounted to 2005 using a 5% discount rate. 
 
Environmental effects 
Under the emissions numbers produced by this proposal, the concentration of CO2 
in the atmosphere is projected to reach 460 ppm in the latter half of the century (see   
Figure 8). Based on the modeled trajectory of concentrations, the rise in global average 
temperature above pre-industrial levels is projected to be less than 2.8 degrees Celsius 
(°C) at the end of the century, versus almost 4°C
30 under the BAU trajectory (see Figure 
9). The result is less ambitious than the goal of stabilizing the temperature increase below 
2°C,  set  by the G-8 leaders at their 2009 summit.   The very modest reduction in 
temperature that results from increasingly stringent climate policies may be disappointing 
to some.  However,  it  is due to  nonlinearity:  a  1%  decrease  in  CO2  concentrations 
                                                 
30 Temperature projections have always to be considered as best guesses.  Large uncertainties affecting the 
carbon cycle and climate feedbacks could alter the true result in term of temperature increase.   39 
translates to less than a  1% decrease in global warming.  Policies aimed at reducing 
emissions from land use and other greenhouse gasses could enhance the impact of the 
policy on final temperature.  
 
 
Figure  8:    Path  of  CO2 concentrations  that achieves  year-2100 goal  of  460 ppm  
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Figure 9: Rise in temperature under proposed targets vs. BAU    40 
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Conclusions 
 
  Some readers may conclude that the results above suggest that more ambitious 
environmental goals of 460 ppm in CO2 concentrations are not attainable in practice, and 
that our earlier proposal for attaining 500 ppm is the better plan (Frankel, 2009).   We 
take no position on which environmental goal is best overall.   Rather, we argue that 
whatever the environmental goal, our approach will give targets that are more practical, 
both economically and politically, than the approaches that have been proposed by others.  
 
A politically credible framework 
  The framework presented here specifies the allocation of emissions targets across 
countries in a way that gives every country reason to believe that it is only doing its fair   41 
share  and  that  builds  trust  as  the  decades  pass.    Without  such  a  framework, 
announcements of distant future goals will not be credible and thus will not have the 
desired  effects.  Furthermore,  this  framework—in  providing  for  a  decade-by-decade 
sequence  of  emissions  targets,  each  determined  on  the  basis  of  a  few principles  and 
formulas—is flexible enough that, by small changes in the formula parameters, it can 
accommodate  major  changes  in  economic,  environmental,  political,  or  technological 
circumstances during the course of the century. 
 
Directions for future research 
  We have identified several directions for extending our research in the future. 
First, we could compare our proposed set of emissions paths to other proposals 
being discussed in the climate change policy community or being analyzed using other 
integrated assessment models.
31  Our conjecture is that we could identify countries and 
periods in alternative pathways where an agreement would be unlikely to last because its 
targets were not designed to limit economic costs for each country. 
Second, we could take into account GHGs ot her than CO2 and allow for other 
mitigation measures such as forestation, updating them to reflect the outcome of ongoing 
negotiations. 
Third, we could implement constraints on international trading.  Such constraints 
can arise either from a philosophical worldview that considers it unethical to pay others 
to take one‘s medicine, or from a more cynical worldview that assumes international 
                                                 
31 For example, the CLEAR path offered by Wagner et al. (2008) proposes that by 2050 Russia has cut its 
emissions 30 percent below 1990 levels, China 46 percent below 2012 levels, India 8 percent above 2012 
levels, and the other non-Annex I countries 23 percent below 2012 levels.    The Global Development 
Rights approach of Baer et al. (2008) proposes a US emissions target for 2025 that is 99 percent below its 
BAU path.      42 
transfers via permit sales will only line the pockets of corrupt leaders.   Constraints on 
trading could take the form of quantity restrictions—for example, that a country cannot 
satisfy  more  than  Z  percent  of  its  emissions  obligation  through  international  permit 
purchases.   
   The fourth possible extension of this research represents the most important step 
intellectually: to introduce uncertainty, that is, to allow for rates of economic growth or 
technological progress that turn out to be higher or lower than was forecast in the BAU 
path.  We would show the consequences of our rule that if any country makes an ex post 
determination in any period that by staying in the treaty it loses more than X percent of 
income, even though this had not been the expectation ex ante, that country will drop out.  
One benefit of this exercise would be to assure those who believe that the costs are likely 
eventually to be lower (or higher) than implied by the WITCH model that the target 
formulas could be adjusted accordingly, as the truth is revealed, while staying within the 
framework.    
The ultimate objective in making the model stochastic would be to show that the 
general policy framework is relatively robust with respect to unexpected developments 
and to seek modifications of the formulas to produce a version that is still more robust.  
Formulas should be set so as to protect against inadvertent stringency on the one hand—
that is, a situation where the cost burden imposed on a particular country is much higher 
than expected—or inadvertent ―hot air‖ on the other hand.
32   
Three possible modifications for dealing with uncertainty are promising.   First, 
we should allow for renegotiation of parameters along the way if there are unexpected 
                                                 
32 ―Hot air‖ refers to the possibility that targets are based on obsolete emissions levels with the result that 
countries are credited for cutting tons of emissions that would not have been emitted anyway.  
   43 
developments in the future.     Second, when the target for each decade is set, it should be 
indexed to GDP within that budget period. Perhaps the constant of proportionality in the 
indexation formula would simply equal 1, in which case it becomes an efficiency target, 
expressed  in  carbon  emissions  per  unit  of  GDP.  This  approach  would  be  much  less 
vulnerable  to  within-decade  uncertainty  (Lutter,  2000).    A  third  possible  feature  that 
would make the policy more robust and that is favored by many economists is an escape 
clause or safety valve that would limit costs in the event that mitigation proves more 
expensive  than  expected,  perhaps  with  a  symmetric  floor  on  the  price  of  carbon  in 
addition to the usual ceiling.   44 
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